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Is	  EU	  Law	  Neuro-­‐Friendly?	  
Anne-­‐Lise	  SIBONY	  
Remarks	  presented	  at	  the	  conference	  
Neuroscience	  in	  European	  and	  North	  American	  Case	  Law	  
Court	  of	  Appeals	  of	  Milan,	  September	  17th	  2010	  
	  
The	  question	  put	  to	  this	  panel	  is	  «	  is	  your	  system	  neuro-­‐friendly	  ?	  ».	  On	  the	  program,	  
Belgium	   stands	   after	  my	  name,	   but	   I	   should	   confess	   right	   at	   the	  outset	   that	   I	   don’t	   know	  
much	  about	  the	  Belgian	  legal	  system.	  I	  studied	  in	  France	  and	  in	  the	  UK.	  At	  the	  moment,	  I	  am	  
exercising	  my	   right	   to	   free	  movement	   and	  work	   in	  Belgium,	  where	   I	   teach,	  well…	  EU	   law.	  
«	  My	  »	  system,	  therefore	  –	  If	  I	  can	  use	  the	  possessive	  –	  really	  is	  the	  EU	  legal	  system.	  
After	  this	  admission,	  you	  could	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  I	  came	  to	  Milan	  for	  the	  sake	  
of	   Italy	   because,	   in	   truth,	   EU	   law	   as	   it	   stands	   does	   not	   rule	   on	   admissibility	   of	   evidence,	  
therefore	   also	   not	   on	   admissibility	   of	   Neuroscientific-­‐evidence.	   In	   deed,	   admissibility	   of	  
evidence	  in	  a	  civil	  or	  criminal	  trial	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  national	  law.	  
Although	   I	  gladly	  plead	  guilty	  on	  the	  charge	  of	  being	  prejudiced	   in	   favour	  of	   Italy,	   I	  
also	   came	   to	   tell	   you	   something	  about	  how	  neuro-­‐friendly	  EU	   law	   is	  or	   could	  be.	  Before	   I	  
present	  my	  remarks	  in	  this	  regard,	  I	  should	  stress	  that	  neuro-­‐friendliness	  of	  EU	  law	  cannot	  
be	  assessed	  only	  in	  connexion	  with	  criminal	  law.	  I	  will	  start	  from	  there	  but	  then	  move	  on	  to	  
private	  EU	  law,	  taking	  two	  examples:	  one	  in	  trade	  mark	  law	  and	  the	  other	  in	  consumer	  law.	  
1. EU	  law	  and	  admissibility	  of	  neuro-­‐scientific	  evidence	  
I	   just	  stated	  that	  EU	  law	  does	  not	  govern	  admissibility	  of	  evidence.	  This	   is	  generally	  
true,	  but	  two	  caveats	  ought	  to	  be	  mentioned.	  -­‐ First	  caveat:	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  before	  EU	  courts	   is	  of	  course	  a	  matter	  of	  
EU	   law.	   However,	   in	   the	   rules	   of	   procedure	   applicable	   before	   the	   EU	   courts	  
(General	   Court	   and	   Court	   of	   Justice),	   there	   is	   very	   little	   on	   admissibility	   of	  
evidence	   generally	   and	   nothing	   on	   admissibility	   of	   scientific	   evidence	   in	  
particular1.	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  matter	  of	  case	  law.	  	  
And	  	  that	  case	  law	  is	  scarce.	  In	  deed,	  EU	  courts	  have	  not	  often	  been	  confronted	  
with	   neuro-­‐scientific	   evidence.	   Exceptions	   include	   neurotoxicity	   studies	   in	  
chemical	  substance	  cases2	  and	  neurological	  evidence	  in	  staff	  cases	  (including	  one	  
about	   a	   civil	   servant	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   who	   had	   been	   convicted	   of	  
statutory	   rape	  by	  a	   criminal	   court	   in	  Brussels	   and	  had	  his	   sentence	   reduced	  on	  
                                                
1	  The	  only	  provisions	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  applicable	  before	  EU	  courts	  concerning	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  
deal	  with	  the	  language	  in	  which	  oral	  testimony	  may	  be	  given	  (art.	  29	  of	  the	  RoP	  of	  the	  Court,	  art.	  35	  of	  the	  RoP	  
of	   the	   General	   Court),	   oath	  witnesses	   are	   asked	   to	   take	   (art.	   47	   of	   RoP	   of	   the	   Court,	   art.	   68	   of	   RoP	   of	   the	  
General	  Court),	  objections	  against	  witnesses	  (art.	  50	  of	  the	  RoP	  of	  the	  Court,	  art.	  73	  of	  the	  RoP	  of	  the	  General	  
Court)	  and	  the	  timing	  for	  submitting	  evidence	  (art.	  42	  and	  art.	  62a	  of	  RoP	  of	  the	  Court,	  art.	  48	  and	  art.	  76a	  of	  
RoP	  of	  the	  General	  Court).	  RoP	  of	  the	  Court	  are	  published	  in	  OJ	  2010,	  C-­‐177/1	  ;	  RoP	  of	  the	  General	  Court	  are	  
published	  in	  OJ	  2010,	  C-­‐177/37.	  
2 See	  for	  example	  :	  Case	  T-­‐229/04,	  Sweden	  v.	  Commission,	  ECR	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grounds	  of	  his	  neurological	  condition3).	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  very	  few	  European	  
cases	  involving	  neuro-­‐evidence	  is	  hardly	  surprising,	  because	  EU	  courts	  do	  not	  deal	  
with	  the	  one	  field	  in	  which	  most	  NS	  evidence	  is	  adduced	  for	  the	  time	  being,	   i.e.	  
criminal	  law.	  The	  types	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  EU	  courts	  are	  confronted	  with	  draw	  
on	  economics/econometrics	   (in	   the	   field	  of	   competition	   law),	  on	   chemistry	   and	  
medicine	  (in	  the	  field	  of	  food	  law),	  not	  (yet)	  on	  NS.	  	  -­‐ Second	  caveat:	  there	  are	  instruments	  of	  EU	  law	  concerning	  evidence.	  In	  the	  field	  
of	  judicial	  cooperation,	  there	  are	  two	  instruments	  
o In	  civil	  and	  commercial	  matters:	  the	  regulation	  on	  taking	  of	  evidence4	  
o In	  criminal	  matters:	  the	  evidence	  warrant5	  
Neither	  of	   these	   instruments	  harmonise	  national	   laws	  on	  admissibility	  of	   evidence.	  
What	  these	  instruments	  do	  is	  that	  they	  facilitate	  circulation	  of	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  located	  in	  
one	  MS	  when	  a	  Court	  sitting	  in	  another	  MS	  needs	  them.	  For	  example,	  the	  evidence	  warrant	  
would	  allow	  –	  despite	  its	  many	  limitations	  –	  a	  criminal	  judge	  sitting	  in	  Milan	  to	  request	  the	  
results	  of	  a	  brain	  scan	  taken,	  say,	  in	  Belgium	  to	  be	  forwarded	  to	  her	  provided	  these	  results	  
exist	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   request.	   The	   Milan	   criminal	   judge	   could	   not	   however	   use	   this	  
instrument	   to	   request	   a	  witness	   to	   be	   brain-­‐scanned	   in	   Belgium	   as	   the	   evidence	  warrant	  
only	  applies	  to	  existing	  documents	  and	  data.	  	  
In	   civil	   and	   commercial	   matters	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   nothing	   in	   the	   regulation	   on	  
taking	  of	  evidence	  would	  seem	  to	  prevent	  a	  Milanese	  judge	  to	  use	  the	  simplified	  procedure	  
set	   up	   by	   this	   instrument	   to	   request	   his	   Belgian	   counterpart	   to	   order	   that	   a	   person	   be	  
examined	  using	  a	  brain	  scan.	  
In	   criminal	   matters,	   a	   new	   broader	   instrument	   on	   taking	   of	   evidence	   is	   currently	  
being	  discussed	  in	  the	  Council.	  Like	  the	  instrument	  available	  in	  civil	  and	  commercial	  matters,	  
it	  could	  cover	  all	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  a	  criminal	  investigation	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  
restricted	  to	  existing	  evidence	  of	  a	  specific	  nature.	  This	  would	  confront	  courts	  more	  directly	  
with	  differing	  national	  rules	  on	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  in	  general	  and	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  
in	  particular.	  Such	  a	  development	  could,	  in	  turn,	  lead	  to	  some	  measure	  of	  harmonisation	  as	  
the	  Lisbon	  treaty	  provides	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  this	  (article	  82,	  para.	  3),	  but	  this	  is	  probably	  not	  
going	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  
  In	  other	  words,	  EU	  law	  does	  not	  currently	  deal	  with	  admissibility	  of	  scientific	  evidence,	  
but	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   evidence	   it	   set	   out	   to	   organise	   will,	   in	   time,	   create	  
confrontation	  –	   if	  not	   competition	  –	  among	  national	  procedural	   laws	   concerning,	   inter	  
alia,	  admissibility	  of	  scientific	  evidence.	  
                                                
3 Cases	   T-­‐144/96.	   See	   also	   Case	   T-­‐84/98 concerning	   the	   medical	   condition	   of	   a	   secretary	   of	   the	   European	  
Parliament	   who	   suffered	   brain	   damage	   after	   an	   accident.	   Note	   that	   in	   staff	   cases,	   the	   EU	   Courts	   perform	  
limited	  judicial	  review	  of	  administrative	  decision.	  In	  this	  context,	  they	  neither	  re-­‐assess	  evidence,	  nor	  do	  they	  
request	  new	  evidence. 
4	  Council	  Regulation	   (EC)	  No	  1206/2001	  of	  28	  May	  2001	  on	  cooperation	  between	   the	  courts	  of	   the	  Member	  
States	  in	  the	  taking	  of	  evidence	  in	  civil	  or	  commercial	  matters,	  OJ	  L	  174,	  27.6.2001,	  p.	  1–24.	  
5	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/978/JHA	  of	  18	  December	  2008	  on	  the	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  for	  the	  
purpose	   of	   obtaining	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	   matters,	   OJ	   L	   350,	  
30.12.2008,	  p.	  72–92.	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Moving	   on	   now	   to	  where	   EU	   law	  as	   it	   stands	   does	   or	   could	  meet	   neuro-­‐science,	   I	  
would	   like	   to	   take	   two	   examples,	   one	   in	   the	   field	   of	   trade	  mark	   and	   one	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
consumer	  protection.	  
2. Where	   neuro-­‐scientific	   evidence	   could	   be	   relevant:	   an	   example	   from	   EU	  
trade	  mark	  law	  
In	  several	  member	  states,	  trade	  mark	  offices	  have	  been	  confronted	  with	  applications	  
for	  olfactory	   trade	  marks,	   i.e.	  applications	   to	  register	  a	  smell	  as	  a	  distinctive	  sign.	  Because	  
national	   laws	  on	   trade	  mark	  are	  partially	  harmonised	  by	  EU	   law,	   legal	  questions	   raised	  by	  
such	  cases	  have	  sometimes	  reached	  the	  Court	  of	  justice	  by	  way	  of	  requests	  for	  preliminary	  
rulings.	  An	  example	   is	  the	  Ralf	  Sieckmann	  case	  (Case	  C-­‐273/00).	   In	   itself,	   the	   judgement	   in	  
this	  case	  is	  not	  remarkable:	  the	  Court	  rules	  that	  the	  first	  directive	  on	  trade	  mark	  should	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that	  -­‐ any	  distinctive	  sign	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  registered	  as	  a	  trade	  mark.	  It	  doesn’t	  have	  
to	  be	  a	  visual	  sign,	  like	  a	  sequence	  of	  letters	  or	  a	  particular	  design,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  a	  
smell	  -­‐ but	   the	  distinctive	   sign	   should	  be	   capable	  of	  being	   represented	  graphically	   in	   a	  
manner	  that	  is	  clear,	  precise,	  self-­‐contained,	  easily	  accessible,	  intelligible,	  durable	  
and	   objective,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   difficult	   conditions	   to	   meet	   for	   any	   graphic	  
representation	  of	  a	  smell	  
The	   reason	  why	   this	   case	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   is	   because	   the	   opinion	   of	   Advocate	  
General	  Colomer	  highlights	  very	  clearly	  the	  relevance	  of	  neuro-­‐science	  to	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  the	  first	  trade	  mark	  directive	  in	  a	  case	  such	  as	  this	  one.	  Again,	  the	  question	  was:	  “can	  a	  
smell	  be	  registered	  as	  trade	  mark?”.	  The	  first	  condition	  to	  be	  met	  –	  I’m	  leaving	  the	  second	  
condition	  aside	  –	  is	  that	  the	  sign,	  here	  the	  smell,	  should	  be	  distinctive.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  legal	  question,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  assess	  whether	  humans	  are	  in	  
general	  capable	  of	  recognising	  a	  smell	  and	  associating	  it	  with	  a	  particular	  memory.	  Common	  
sense	  suggests	  it	  is	  the	  case.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  AG	  Colomer	  looked	  
for	   literature	   to	   support	   this	   intuition.	   He	   cites	   a	   study	   by	   a	   legal	   scholar,	   who	   refers	   to	  
neuroscience	  of	  perception.	  He	  takes	  from	  this	  article	  that	  
“studies	   of	   the	   perception	   of	   odours	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   olfactory	   memory	   is	  
probably	  the	  best	  one	  that	  humans	  possess”6.	  
He	  then	  continues	  
“The	   sense	   of	   smell	   is,	   because	   of	   its	   special	   function	   in	   the	   nervous	   system,	   very	  
closely	  linked	  to	  the	  limbic	  structures	  that	  affect	  memories	  and	  emotions.	  According	  
to	   the	   latest	   discoveries	   in	   neurophysiology,	   memories	   and	   emotions	   are	   closely	  
interlinked,	  as	  Marcel	  Proust	  well	  understood”7.	  
In	  this	  particular	  case,	  NS	  “evidence”	  was	  not	  decisive,	  because	  smells,	  even	   if	   they	  
can	   be	   distinctive,	   failed	   on	   the	   other	   criterion,	   that	   of	   suitability	   for	   graphical	  
representation.	  	  
In	  my	  view,	  it	  nevertheless	  brings	  2	  interesting	  elements	  to	  the	  discussion:	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-­‐ The	   first	   element	   is	   to	   do	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   “evidence”	   that	   is	   useful	   in	   the	  
judicial	  process.	   It	   is	  not	  only	  case-­‐specific	  evidence:	  here	   the	  question	  was	  not	  
“does	   this	   person	   remember	   smells?”	   but	   “do	   people	   generally	   remember	  
smells?”.	  It	  is	  a	  general	  statement	  about	  our	  perception	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  
law.	  This	  is	  important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  
o First,	  scientists	  generally	  feel	  much	  more	  comfortable	  making	  this	  sort	  of	  
general	  statements	  as	  opposed	  to	  case-­‐specific	  statements;	  
o Second,	   when	   science	   is	   fed	   into	   the	   judicial	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
through	  judicial	  notice	  rather	  than	  through	  case-­‐specific	  expert	  evidence,	  
the	  cost	  is	  less	  and	  it	  is	  not	  borne	  by	  the	  parties.	  	  
Of	  course,	  these	  two	  means	  of	  absorbing	  science	  will	  not	  be	  available	  alternatives	  
in	  all	  cases.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  only	  that	  there	  are	  several	  different	  ways	  to	  bring	  
(neuro-­‐)scientific	   knowledge	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   law	   depending	   on	   how	   the	   legal	  
question	   is	   framed.	   Adducing	   expensive	   case-­‐specific	   evidence	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
one.	  
In	  deed,	  and	  this	   is	  what	   I	  want	  to	   illustrate	  with	  my	  second	  and	   last	  example,	  one	  
way	  law	  absorbs	  general	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  through	  creating	  presumptions.	  I	  don’t	  know	  
if	  presumptions	  based	  on	  NS	  are	  already	  accepted	  by	  courts	  in	  the	  EU	  –	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  
question	  worth	  investigating	  –	  but	  I	  can	  think	  of	  a	  field	  of	  law	  in	  which	  it	  would	  make	  sense,	  
namely	   consumer	   law.	   Part	   of	   consumer	   law	   is	   about	   affording	   protection	   against	   undue	  
influence	  on	  consumer	  behaviour,	  whether	  through	  advertising	  or	  other	  unfair	  commercial	  
practices.	  
3. Where	   neuro-­‐scientific	   evidence	   could	   lead	   to	   presumptions:	   an	   example	  
from	  EU	  consumer	  law	  
The	  directive	  on	  unfair	  commercial	  practices	  harmonises	  national	  laws	  on	  this	  subject	  
matter.	   It	   defines	   the	   commercial	   practices	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   prohibited	   in	   all	   27	   national	  
legal	  systems.	  The	  general	  definition	  of	  an	  unfair	  practice	  contains	  2	  criteria:	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
“unfair”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  directive,	  the	  practice	  needs	  to	  be	  -­‐ contrary	  to	  professional	  diligence	  (first	  puzzle,	  but	  I	  leave	  it	  aside	  here)	  -­‐ it	  materially	  distorts	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  materially	  distort	  the	  economic	  behaviour	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  average	  consumer	  whom	  it	  reaches	  or	  to	  whom	  it	  is	  
addressed,	  or	  of	  the	  average	  member	  of	  the	  group	  when	  a	  commercial	  practice	  is	  
directed	  to	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  consumers	  
How	  does	  a	   judge	  know	  if	  a	  given	  commercial	  practice	   is	   likely	  to	  materially	  distort	  
the	  choice	  pattern	  of	  consumers?	  Studies	  by	  psychologist	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  this	  question.	  
Some	   influencing	   techniques	   are	   well	   documented	   –	   and	   they	   are	   taught	   in	   marketing	  
courses.	  But	  this	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  in	  a	  disputed	  case.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  likelihood	  that	  
a	  given	  technique	  alters	  behaviour	  of	  the	  average	  shopper,	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  relevant	  to	  
know	  how	   it	  could	   influence	  choice	  (or	  to	  question	  the	  same,	  depending	  which	  side	  of	  the	  
argument	  you	  are	  on).	  Neuro-­‐science	  could	  be	  called	  on	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  such	  questions	  as:	  -­‐ 	  how	  does	  the	  sequence	  of	  information	  given	  to	  a	  consumer	  affect	  her	  decision?	  -­‐ does	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  “free	  gift”	  affect	  choice	  even	  where	  the	  consumer	  is	  then	  
told	  the	  store	  ran	  out	  of	  gifts	  before	  she	  makes	  the	  purchase?	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And	   if	   it	   does,	   this	   knowledge	  would	   not	   only	   be	   relevant	   once,	   for	   one	   particular	  
trial.	   By	   its	   very	   nature,	   it	   would	   be	   suitable	   to	   be	   translated	   as	   a	   presumption,	  
provided	  it	  is	  robust	  enough.	  
My	  point	  really	  is:	  if	  marketing	  departments	  use	  neuro-­‐imaging	  –	  and	  they	  do	  –	  it	  is	  
likely	  that	  neuro-­‐evidence	  could	  be	  presented	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  influencing	  power	  
of	  a	  marketing	  technique	  is	  at	  stake.	  When	  it	  is	  presented,	  its	  value	  will	  not	  be	  case-­‐
specific.	  It	  would	  be	  commercial	  practice-­‐specific.	  
	  
The	  take-­‐home	  message	  is	  three	  fold:	  	  -­‐ EU	  law	  does	  not	  contain	  specific	  rules	  on	  admissibility	  of	  scientific	  evidence,	  but	  
by	  organising	  circulation	  of	  evidence	  across	  member	  states	  it	  could,	  in	  time,	  lead	  
to	  approximation	  of	  national	  laws	  	  -­‐ neuro-­‐evidence	  is	  not	  only	  relevant	  to	  criminal	  trials,	  it	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  fields	  of	  
law	  where	  the	  reaction	  of	  consumers	  to	  particular	  stimuli	  has	  to	  be	  assessed	  -­‐ neuro-­‐evidence	  worthy	  of	  study	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  trial-­‐specific	  evidence	  
